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In this paper  I demonstrate  that lhe explanatory  power  of employer
size variables in nonunion  wage  regressions  is diminished  by allowing  the
coefficient of tenure  (years  on current job) to vary wjth employer  size.
Among  nonunion  workers,  average  tenure  and  the coefficient of tenure
increase  with both firm size and  plant size.  Thjs pattern is consistent
with the hypothesis  that investment  in specific human  cap'ita1  accounts  for
much  of the previousiy  unexplained  relationship between  employer  size and
nonunion  wages. The  relationships between  compensation,  tenure, and
employer  size are different  for union  workers.  Employer  size is less
important  generally, and  the importance  of plant size is especially low,
Aiso, the data are more  consistent  with the specific human  capital model
when  union  compensatjon  is measured  by annual  income  rather than the hourly
wage.SPECIFIC  TRAINING,  UNIONS,  AND  THE  RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN  EMPLOYER  SIZE AND  I,dAGES
Twenty-five  percent  of U.S. wage  and  salary workers  are employed
jn firms of fewer  than 25 employees,  while at least 34 percent  work  in
firms of 1000  employees  or more.1 0n uu."ug", employees  of the largest
firms receive  wages  that are 12  percent  higher than employees  of the
smaliest  firms, even  after  adjustment  for differences in education,  tenure,
and  union  membership  (l4el1ow  (1983),  Table  2).  This result is  supported  by
other studies, which  have  consi  stently found  that wages  increase  with
employer  size (Freeman  and  Medoff  (1981), Lester  (1967), and  Masters
(1969)).  Mellowrs  estimate  is an average  of dissimilar relationships  among
union  and  nonunion  workers.  Recent  studies shovr  that union  wages  vary much
less with employer  size than  do nonunion  wages.
In this  paper  I demonstrate  that the explanatory  powen  of employer
sjze variables in nonunion  wage  regressions  is diminished  by allowing  the
coefficjent of tenure  (years  on current job) to vary lrith employer  size.
Among  nonunion  workers,  average  tenure  and  the coeffjcient of tenure
increase  wjth both firm size and  plant size.  This pattern is consistent
with the hypothesis  that investment  in specific human  capital accounts  for
much  of the previously  unexplained  nelationship  between  employer  size and
nonu  n  ion wages.
The  relationships  between  compensation,  tenure, and  employer  size
are different  for union  workers.  Employer  size is  less important
generally, and  the importance  of plant size is especially low.  A1  so, the
data are more  consistent  !{ith the spec'if  ic  human  capital mode'l  when  union
compensation  is measured  by annual  income  rather than the hourly wage.
Union  wages  and  average  tenure increase  modestly  with fjrm size, but the2
contrjbutjon of tenure  to hourly \{age  rates does  not consi  stently increase
viith ejther f  jr"m  or plant size.  0n the other hand,  tenurers  contribution
to the annual  incomes  of union  workers  does  increase  modestly  with fjrm
size.  This suggests  that among  union  membens,  specific training has  jts
principal effects on dimensjons  of compensation  other than  wage  rates.
I.  Backqround
A.  Theory
Among  the explanations  for the positive association  between
employer  size and  wages  is the hypothesis  that the quality of the average
worker  increases  with employer  size.2  This proposition is supported  by
data from  the May  1979  Cur-rent  Population  Survey,3  whjch  contain
informatjon  on both employer  size and  the standard  complement  of human
capital variables.  Nevertheless,  a signifjcant,  positive relationship
between  size and  wages  remains  after  standardizing  for djfferences in age,
schooling,  and  both  experience  and  tenure.
A dimension  of labor quality that may  not have  been  captured
successfully  by the standard  specification of the wage  equation  js
firm-specific human  capita1.  Such  capital consists of skiII  or knowledge
that is valuable  in the wonker's  current job but would  be much  less so if
the worker  began  working  for another  employer  (Becker  (1975),0i  (1961)).
In addition to explicit  training,  the concept  includes  activities  that
'improve  the qual  ity  of the match  between  employer  and  employees,  such as
recruitjng and  screening  (Jovanovich  (1979)).
0i  (1983)  argues  that specific capital increases  with employer
A
size.'  His conclusion  follows from  his assumption  that large firms are theJ
product  of the superior  entrepreneurial  skills  of exceptional  managers.
These  individuals  do not have  superior  supervisory  skills,  however.
Consequently,  wjth their  comparative  disadvantage  at superv  js'ion, managers
of large organizations  have  a stronger  incentive  to'l imit the amount  of
time they spend  monitoring  subordinates. Rel  iable workers  are productive
with less monitoring,  and  screening  and  training contribute  to reliability.
Adopting  standardized  procedures  that are unique  to the organjzation  also
holds  down  monitoring  costs.  All  these increase  the amount  of firm
specific jnvestment  in each  vorker.
If  specific human  capital does  rise with emp'loyer  size, and  if  the
standard  wage  equations  do not capture  the return to this  capital properly,
then some  of the remaining  relationship between  employer  size and  wages  can
be explained  by improving  this  aspect  of the specification.  Stocks  of
specific capital are not observable,  so  differences  in such  capital must  be
jnferred indirectly.  The  most  common  approach  is to use information  on
tenure, age, and  education. Investments  in specific capital produce
'incentives  for both employer  and  employee  to make  their  association  a
durable  one,  l'4uch  theoretical work  has  addressed  the ways  these  incentives
affect this  aspect  of the  behavior  of labor market  participants.  (Parsons
(1972), Jovanovich  (1979),  Carmichael  (1983), and  Coyte  (1984))  The
general  conclusjon  is that specific capital will  make  wages  an increasing
function of years  of service  with the current employer,  as well as years of
other labor market  experience  and  schooling.
An  extension  of this  reasoning  leads  to the hypothesjs  that
tenure's contribution to waqe  rates should  increase  with the amount  ofspecific capital  .  From  there it  js a short step to predicting that the
contribution of tenure  to wages  will  increase  with employer  size.
Furthermore,  a specification thaL allows  the coefficient of tenure  to vary
with employer  size wil l allocate less explanatory  power  to varjables
measuring  employer  sjze than  wi  I  I  a specification constraining  the
coefficient of tenure  to be equal  for workers  in all  employer  size classes.
Some  suggestive  evidence  aiong  this 
'l 
ine is  reported  in Mel  low
(1983).  Using  the May  1979  CPS,  he  found  that  average  tenure  and  the
coefficjent of tenure in nonunion  wage  equations  both increase  with firm
sjze.  Th'i  s result was  obtained  from  separate  regressions  over three fjrm
size classes, so variables  capturi  ng  an independent  effect of fjrm size
were  not included.  In the next section I  use  the same  data and  further
explore  the i  n  t  e  r  r  e  I  a  t  i  o  n  s  h  i  p between  employer  size, tenure, and  wages. A
series of regressions  reveal  s the extent to which  the explanatory  power  of
employer  size variables 'i  s diminished  by allowing  the coefficient of tenure
to vary with employer  size.  A brief description of the data and  regression
spec  ifi cati  ons  precedes  the regressi  on resul  ts.
B.  The  data and  speci  fi cati  on
The  1979  May  CPS  provides  information  on personal  characteristics,
union  status, hourly wage,  and  employer  sjze for a random  sample  of
individuals in the labor force.  The  data place  workers  jn one  of fjve
categories  for both plant/office  and  firm/agency  size.  (The  latter  differs
from  the former  for employees  of multi-esLabljshment  enterprises.  )  The
smallest  category  is  1-24  employees,  and  the largest is  1000  employees  or
m0re.5
The  CPS  file  includes  information  on size of firm and  size of
plant.  Although  incorporaLing  both  dimensjons  into the equation  is
desirable, estimating  separate  effects for plant size and  firm size is made
difficult  by the relatively  smal  l  amount  of independent  var  iation between
the two.  Sixty percent  of the sample  report that their  plant and  firm are
in the same  size class.  This dependence  is not cojncidental  .  Employees  of
firms in the smallest  size class must  also work  in plants of the smallest
size class.  Employees  of firms in the next size class must  work  in
establ  ishments  of that size class or the one  smaller  ciass, and  so on.
This interdependence  can  be incorporated  by 'including  a separate
dummy  variable for each  feasible combinatjon  of firm size and  plant size.
Because  such  a model  produces  an unwieldy  set of results, the specification
that  I  adopt  comb'ines  the fjrst  four size classes  into two.  The  resulting
size classes  are 1-99  workers, 100-999,  and  1,000  workens  or more.
Combining  groups  this way  reduces  the number  of employer  size parameters
from  14  to 5 without seriously  disturbing their  general  pattern.5
Estimates  not reported  show  that none  of the qualitatjve properties  that
w'i  ll  receive  attention are different  in the comDlete  model  from  the results
reported be  1  ow.
The  equation  estimated  has  the form
(  1)
3i
w=c+I  tc,'l  -D(Sr.i)  +pTEN+  trX+€
i-t  i-1'u  'J
t-L  J-  tb
w is the log of the indjvidual's hourly  wage,  D(S.,.i)  is a bjnary variable
equal  to l  when  the indjvidualrs employer  is  in fjnm size class i  and  plant
sjze class j,  TEN  is the 1og  of years  on current job, and  X is a vector of
control variables.  0f the parameters  Lo be estimated,  c is the constant
term and  q, E, and  tr  are coeffjcjents.  The  summation  over i  begins  with
i=2 because  the smallest  fi rmlplant size class (i=5=1; js used  as the base
group.  The  at  represent  differences between  the intercept of the wage
functjon for this  smallest  size class and  the intercepts for each  of the
larger size classes.  Included  in the control  s are other expelience  and its
square,  years of schooling  and  its  square,  the percentage  of the workers  jn
the individualrs industry  who  are union  members,  and  sets of binary
variables for race, sex, jndustry, occupatjon,  and  region.  Separate
equations  are estimated  for union  and  nonunion  wages.
If  wages  increase  monotonjcally  wjth employer  size in both
dimensions,  then the following conditions  will  hold:
Condition  (a):  oij  '  0 for al  I  i ,j;
Condition  (b):  oi'j'oi,,j_1  for all  i  such  that 1<  j  s il
Condition  (c):  crr> 0 and  oij,roi_1,j,  for aiI  i  such  that
Condition  (a) asserts  that wages  will  be lower  for workers  in the
size class than for workers  jn all  other employer  size classes.
very weak  test of the importance  of employer  size.  Condition  (b)
for each  firm size class.i ',  wages  wjll  jncrease  with plant size.
Condition  (c) claims  that for each  piant size class j',  wages  wiI
wi  th fi rm  size.




I  i ncr"easeI
Although  one  could  eval  uate test  statistics  for each  of the
pair-wise relationships implied  in conditions  (a),  (U), and  (c),  reported
results will  be confined  to F statistjcs  corresponding  to the following
joi nt nul  I  hypotheses:
Hypothesi  s (a):  q--=0 for al  I  i ,j;
Hypothesis  (b):  d-.r:=it., ., ,  for all  j  such  that 1<  j  s i'; 'I 
J  t  ,J-t
Hypothesi  s (c):  cn,=0  and  c..:r=3. ,  .,, for all  i  such  that 1 < i  < i'. t!  tJ  t-t,J'
These  F ratios provide  handy  summary  statistics  for assessing  the
significance  of the relationships  among  the coefficients.  If  the
coefficients of equation  (1) have  the relatjonships specified in Conditions
(a) through  (c),  and  if  Hypotheses  (a) through  (c) are rejected, then wages
can  clearly be regarded  as incr"easing  jn both  djmensions  of employer  size.
In most  cases,  however,  the condjtions  specified  will  be  met  for  some
combjnations  of parameters  but not for others.  In these  cjrcumstances,
some  j udgement  wi  I 
'l 
be requi  red.
The  specification in equation  (1) constrains  the return to tenure
(S) to be equal  across  employer  sjze classes.  Relaxing  thjs  constrajnt
I  eads  to equation  (2):
3i3i
(2)  v./  = c +  I  Io,.D(S,.,)  + gnTEN  + E  EgriTENxD(S'lr)  + trX  + e.
j-,  i'-1  ,J  ,J  u  j-r  .:-1  ,J  ,J
t-L  J-L  t-a  J-r
The  Sr5 in this equation  measure  the differences between  the coefficient of
tenure  for workers  in the smallest  employer  size class (86) and  tne
coefficient of tenure  for workers  in  size class ij.6
The  results reported  for equation  (2) wjll  jnclude F statistics
corresponding  to Hypotheses  (a)-(c).  The  hypothesized  relationship between
specific human  capital and  employer  size will  produce  estimates  of g-- that
are positiVe and  are incneasing  functjons  of both fjrm and  plant size.
Thus, identical condjtions  and  hypotheses  to (a)-(c)  can  be constructed  for
the Bij.  The  corresponding  F statistics  will  be reported  with the
coefficients of the size-tenure  interactions.
II.  Resulls
Table  l  displays  data showing  the behavior  of average  tenure  and
the di  stribution of workers  across  employer  s.ize  classes.  Nonunion  workers
are heavi  ly concentrated  in small employers  (45 percent  are in firms of
fewer  than 100  workers),  they have  1ow  average  tenure, and  thejr  average
tenure  rises consistently  with both firm size and  plant size.  Union
workers  are heavily concentrated  in large firms (nearly 60 percent  are in
firms of L,000+  workers), they have  high average  tenure, and  their  average
tenure  rjses more  strongly  with firm size than plant size.
The  results of estimating  equations  l  and  2 are displayed  in the
next two tables.  Results  from  the sample  of nonunion  workers  are shown  in
Table  2, while estimates  from  the sample  of union  workers  are provided  in
Table  3.  The  coefficients are presented  in matlix form  to faciljtate
comparison  along  one  dimensjon  of empioyer  size while holding  the value  of
the other dimension  constant.  In the column  to the right  of the
coefficients are the F statistics  corresponding  to the nul'l hypotheses  that
the coefficients withi  n each  row  are equal  .  Below  each  set of coefficients
are F statistics  corresponding  to the null  hypotheses  that intercept andslope  coefficients are equal  down  the columns. (In the first  column,  the
nul1 hypothesis  is that the coefficients wjll  all  be 0.  This follows from
Condi  ti on C.  )
A.  Nonun  i  on lllage  RaLes
The  estimates  in the top section  of Table  2 indicate that nonun'ion
vtages  increase  consjstently  with both firm size and  plant size.  The  F
statistics  indicate that the hypothesis  of equal  ity  of intercepts along  the
various rows  and  columns  can  be rejected at the 1-percent  level in three
cases  and  the 1O-percent  level in the rema'ining  case.  The  null  hypothesis
that the intercepts are all  equal  is overwhelmingly  rejected.
An  assessment  of the importance  of firm size versus  plant size
reveal  s a mixed  picture.  If  attention i  s confined  to plants employing
fetver  than 1,000  wonkers,  wages  appear  to jncrease  more  strongly wjth fjrm
size.  To see  this,  note that wages  increase  from  4 to 5! percent  with each
step increase  in firm size.6  This can  be compared  with increases  of about
2l percent  as plant sjze rjses from  the smallest  to the intermediate  class.
But in the largest firms, wages  are over 10 percent  highen  in plants of
1,000+  workers  than in plants employing  100  !o 999  workers. Thus,  plant
size has  uneven  effects on wages,  and  this  unevenness  makes  relative
importance  of firm versus  plant size vary across  the range  of the p.lant
s  ize variable.
Allowing  the coeffjcient of tenure  to vary with employer  s'ize  has
a dramatic  effect on the estjmates  of the or|  As shown  in the middle
section  of Table  2, these  coeffjcjents are 25 to 60 percent  lower  when  the
interactions are included.  Hypotheses  (b) and  (c) are rejected jn only two10
of the four cases.  In one  case  (the bottom  row), a decl  ine in the
intercept as plant size increases  from  the smallest  sjze class to the
intermedjate  one  contributes to the reject'ion.  The  null  hypothesis  that
the intercepts  are al1 equal  js  still  strongly rejected, but the F
stati stic  is  less than l,/4 its  value  when  equation  (1) is  used.  In
comparison  wjth the pattern in the top sectjon, the tendency  for the
intercepts to increase  with plant size is weaker.
In the bottom  section  of the table, the coefficients of the
size-tenure  interaction variables increase  consistently  wjth employer  size.
The  coefficients withjn the various  rows  and  columns  are significantly
diffenent from  one  another  in three of the four cases.  The  pattern implies
that the tenure  effect rises with both firm and  plant size, but the jump  'in
the effect as sjze increases  to the intermediate  plants in lhe largest
firms is particularly  1arge. Overall, the estimates  jn Table  2 and  the top
of Table  l  are consistent  with the hypothesis  that spec'if  ic human  capital
accounts  for some  of the positive association  between  employer  size and
nonuni  on  wage  rates.
B.  Uni  on  wage  rates
Results  for union  members  are shown  in Table  3.  Using  equat'ion
(1),  the intercepts of the wage  equations  increase  consi  stently wjth both
firm size and  plant size.  Most  of the variation in the 'i  ntercepts  arjses
from  the distinctjvely  higher  wages  in the largest fjrms.  The  estimates  in
the first  ror\,  are small, and  plant size differences are modest  among
workers  in firms of 1,000+  workers.TThe  middle  sectjon of Table  3 indicates  that adding  size-tenure
interactions has  a mixed  effect on the jnLercepts.  The  F statistic  for
Hypothesis  (a) falls  to two-thirds of its  former  va1ue,  but several
coefficients rise.  The  coefficients that increase  are on the diagonal.
The  corner  coefficient,  corresponding  Lo largest finm/smal  lest plant,
declines.  Consequently,  the tendency  for the intercepts to rise with plant
size becomes  more  pronounced,  but firm size differences become  smaller
across  the small  and  intermediate  plants.
Patterns  in the coefficients of the size-tenure  jnteractions,
shown  in the bottom  section, are very different  from  those  for nonunion
workers. The  on]y consistent  trait  js that the coefficients tend to
decline  with plant size.  The  effect of firm sjze is mixed.  The
coefficients decline as one  moves  from  the smallest  firms to the
intermediate  firms, but then they ri se again  as one  moves  down  the columns
to the largest firms.  Nevertheless,  tenure's smallest  contribution to
union  wages  occurs  in the largest employer  size class.
C.  Uni  on annual  i  ncomes
The  irregularjty  of the relationship between  tenure's contribution
and  employer  size in the unjon  hrage  functjon may  be  misleading.  Nonwage
compensation  is more  important  under  collectjve bargaining,S  and  seniority
is widely bel  ieved  to have  more  value jn union  establ  ishments  than in
nonunion  ones-  In particular,  seniority probably  carries more  weight  in
determining  layoffs, rehires, and  overtime  under  collective bargaining.9
Evidence  in Peance  (1983)  indicates that large establishments  in
manufacturing  use  layoffs and  rehjres more  liberally  than small  ones.  In!L
combination  these  considerations  imply that analysis of a broader  measure
of compensatjon  js worth undertaking.
Some  progress  in this directjon can  be  made  by replacing  the
dependent  variable in equations  (1) and  (2) with the log of annual  wage  and
salary income. Table  4 displays  the results for  union  rork"rr.10  They
provjde  more  support  for the specjfjc human  capital model  than Table  3
does,  but some  inconsistencies  between  the estjmates  and  the modei's
predi  cti ons remai  n.
In the top section  of Table  4, the intercepts of the income
functions increase  consjstently !,/ith  employer  size.  When  the jnteractions
of tenure  and  the employer  size dummies  are added,  the estimates  of aij
become  smaller  and  insignificant  in all  cases  but one.  In that one  case,
however,  the estimate  is  larger than its  counterpart  in the top section.
In the bottom  section, the contribution of tenure  to income  increases
steadily with firm size, but the relationship between  the jnteractjon
coefficients and  plant size remajns  negative,  as it  \ras  jn the wage
eq  uat  i  on.
The  tendency  for tenurers  contribution to  increase  with firm sjze
but not wjth plant size matches  the behavior  of mean  tenure  among  union
workers.  Recal  I  from  Table  l  that mean  tenure  of union  workers  rises much
more  strongly  with firm size than  with plant size.  Thus,  the dala are
consistent  with the proposition  that the incentive to remain  with an
employer  increases  with firm size and  that union  workers  respond  to this
i  ncenti  ve.13
Nevertheless,  the support  for the proposition  viith respect  to
employer  size over all  is weak  in spots.  The  F statistics  in the bottom
section  of the table are on the 1ow  side, and  the regression  coefficjents
have  a couple  of points of inconsjstency  with the theory.  The  principal
jnconsjstency  is the very smal  I  contribution of tenure  to jncomes  of
workers  in the largest employers. This suggests  that the incent'ive  to keep
jobs in the largest plants is  relatively  low.  One  would  therefore predict
that average  tenure  among  union  members  working  for  these  employens  will
be less than tenure  among  union  members  working  in smaller  plants.  The
bottom  section  of Table  l  reveals  that it  is not.
Conclusions
The  evidence  presented  jn this  paper  suggests  that among  nonunion
employers,  large ones  emphasize  retention more  than smaller  ones,  The
theory of specific human  capital provides  an explanation  for why  they would
choose  to do this.  The  abjlity  of the employer-size/seniorjty  interactions
to reduce  the differences in wages  across  employer  size classes  strengthens
the argument  that specific training lies  at the heart of the relationship
between  employer  size and  nonunion  wages. Thjs is an jmportant  discovery,
because  the relatjonship is  strongest  for  nonunion  workers. The  absence  of
'information  on training,  tasks, and  ski11s  precludes  a more  djrect test of
the model,  so the possibility  that another  theory provides  a better
exp'lanation  of these  relat.ionships  can  not be ruled out.  But the human
capital model  must  be regarded  as the leading  candidate.
The  relationships between  wages,  seniority,  and  employer  size
among  union  workers  do not lend themselves  to interpretation as14
straightforwardly.  if  the patterns in mean  seniorjty reflect  the
generosity  of compensation,  then firm s'jze  is a more  important  determinant
of total  compensation  than pianL size.  The  wage  regressions  do not
indicate that specific training contrjbutes  to this  relationship, but the
annual  i  ncome  negressions  do.
The  reduced-form  estimates  di  scussed  above  raise as many  questjons
as they answer. Perhaps  the most  useful jnformation  they contain is that
the patterns suggest  that structural estimation  would  prove  rewarding. The
potential simuitaneit'ies  between  wage  profiles,  specific training,  union
membership,  and  turnover have  long been  recognized  (Parsons  (1977)).
Success  in estimatjon  of model  s simultaneously  determining  even  two  of
these  variables  remains  elusive, ho""ve..11 The  evidence  presented  in this
paper  indicates that employer  size may  provide information  useful in
identifying structura'l  model  s attempting  to incorporate  these
si  mul  tanei  ti es.15
FOOTNOTES
1.  The  figures are from  the May  1979  Current  Population  Survey. One  can
nol be  more  confident  about  the percentage  of people  working  in firms
of i,000 workers  or more  because  11  percent  of the respondents  replied
that they did not know  the size of thejr  employer. Some  of these
pnobably  worked  in the largest firm size class, but I  suspect  few of
them  worked  in the smallest  size class.  Because  I believe a Derson
would  know  how  many  co-workers  he had  if  he  were  employed  in an
onganization  employing  fewer  than 25 people,  the first  assertion  is
unqual  ifi ed.
2.  Mellow  (1983)  and  Brown  and  Medoff  (1985)  review  the other
expianations,  which  include  working  conditions, union  avoidance,  and
product market  lowe  r .
This particular CPS  file  includes  some  responses  from  the March  and
June  surveys  .  See  Mel  I  ow  for more  detai  I  s.
Actually, 0i  contends  that specifical  ly-trained workers  will  be
concentrated  primarily in the iargesL  firms.  I  do not express  the
hypothesi  s so restr^ictively.  1n a more  recent al'ticle,  Garen  (  1985)
advances  and  tests a similar hypothesis.
Reporting  the results would  be further simplified by constructjng  two
contjnuous  variables  from  the midpoints  of the intervals and  using  them
in the regressions. The  disadvantages  of that strategy are that  it
imposes  assumDtions  about  the distributions of the size variables





size and  vrages  is linear.  The  first  assumption  cannot  be verified,  and
the results show  the second  to be false.
The  coefficients (multiplied by 100)  can  be interpneted  as approxjmate
percentages. Such  an approximation  is a slight  underestimate,  and  the
bias increases  with the coefficient.  The  true percentage  change  (P) is
gi  ven  by P=1-exp(a).
Tables  2 and  3 do not fully  capture  the djfferences  between  the unjon
and  nonunion  equations. l'/hen  workers  are divjded into five classes  for
both firm and  plant size, the differences between  union  wages  in the
largest firms and  union  wages  in alI  other firms is particularly
pronounced.  Few  coefficients are significant except  those
correspond'i  ng to the firms of 1000+  workers.  In the nonunion
equations,  nearly all  coefficients are significant,  and  wages  increase
consj  stently wi  th empl  oyer si  ze.  Me'l  l  ow  reports comparabl  e resul  ts  i  n
Tab  le 3.
Chapter  4 of Freeman  and  Medoff  (1984)  presents  discussion,  evidence,
and  references  to othen  research.
8.
9.  See  Chapter  8 of Freeman  and  Fledoff  (1984).
10. The  results for nonunion  workers  have  properties very similar to those
of Table  2.  The  principal djfference is that the estimates  of gij  for
the langest  firms (i=3) show  less of a tendency  to increase  with plant
stze.
11. The  most  common  example  of simultaneous
unjon  membersh.ip  as jointly  determined
are common,  some  remain  skeptical about
(1980,  Page  104)  and  Freeman  and  Medoff
estimation  uses  wage  rates and
vari  abl  es.  Al  though  such  model  s
thei  r val  ue.  See  Mi  tchel  l
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C. Est.imates  of 8.,, from  Equation  (2)
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Notes:  a.  Absol  ute t-rati os i  n parentheses.
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siqnificance  level 0f.0001 or less.